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LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT JUMPS ON THE BIG
DATA BANDWAGON: AUTOMATED LICENSE
PLATE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS, INFORMATION
PRIVACY, AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
Bryce Clayton Newell*
I. INTRODUCTION
As government agencies and law enforcement departments increasingly adopt
big-data surveillance technologies as part of their routine investigatory practice,
personal information privacy concerns are becoming progressively more palpable.
On the other hand, advancing technologies and data-mining potentially offer law
enforcement greater ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute criminal activity.
These concerns (for personal information privacy and the efficacy of law
enforcement) are both very important in contemporary society. On one view,
American privacy law has not kept up with advancing technological capabilities,
and government agencies have arguably begun to overstep the acceptable
boundaries of information access, violating the privacy of their citizens and
decreasing the relevancy of the Fourth Amendment. On another, crime has
decreased significantly over the past few decades,1 thanks in part to more effective
and efficient policing,2 and criminal activity has become more technologically
advanced as well; to unduly limit police would hamper legitimate efforts to keep
our communities safe from serious crime.
Despite decades of increasingly safer streets and fewer instances of serious
police-citizen violence in America,3 the police continue to hold a highly criticized
role in society.4 Indeed, most recent press about police use of big data technologies

* Ph.D. Candidate, University of Washington (Seattle), Information School; M.S. in Information
Science, University of Washington; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law. The Author
wishes to thank Adam D. Moore, Matt Fiske-Verkerk, Josef Eckert, Chris Heaney, and Katherine
Thornton for their feedback and assistance with various aspects of this work. All remaining problems
are those of the Author alone.
1. Although for a challenge to this general claim, arguing that the reality is a bit more complex.
See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013).
2. See generally, Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Surveillance for Crime Prevention in
Public Space: Results and Policy Choices in Britain and America, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 497
(2006) (providing evidence that visual CCTV surveillance and improved lighting in urban areas reduce
certain types of crime).
3. See Daniel B. Wood, US Crime Rate at Lowest Point in Decades. Why America Is Safer Now.,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0109/US-crimerate-at-lowest-point-in-decades.-Why-America-is-safer-now; David Seifman, 20 Years of Safer Streets,
N.Y. POST (May 11, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/05/11/20-years-of-safer-streets; see also
Principles of Good Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and Citizens, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CMTY.
REL. SERV., http://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf (last
revised Sept. 2003)
4. For an earlier discussion of this phenomenon, see Egon Bittner, The Functions of Police in
Modern Society, in ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 89-102 (1990).
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has focused on the negative implications that these developments have on citizen
privacy—which is a very important concern5—but less attention has been given to
balancing these privacy interests with the important societal interest in promoting
effective and efficient police work. The tensions between these competing, equally
legitimate aims is substantial and, in the context of police use of automated license
plate recognition (ALPR) systems, limiting the scope of law enforcement data
retention to protect citizen privacy (one option that has begun to find traction in
Canada and in some U.S. states) might also protect the privacy of the police
officers using these systems, as disclosure of these databases to the public under
freedom of information (FOI) laws can allow citizens to track the historical
policing patterns of individual officers.
Significant tensions exist between protecting citizen privacy and promoting
open access to government surveillance information as a form of liberty-preserving
citizen oversight; that is, if we protect privacy at all costs, we may risk limiting our
democratic ability to oversee some government action and thus increase the
potential for arbitrary government domination at direct cost to our freedom. Herein
lies the second troubling conflict: limiting ALPR data retention not only protects
the privacy of innocent individuals whose plates happen to be scanned, but it also
limits the ability of the public to oversee police work, as a form of reciprocal
surveillance, because the records available under FOI laws would be much more
limited. Thus, the interests behind FOI laws, including the implicated First
Amendment rights to gather information about government conduct, and personal
privacy rights are in direct tension, in addition to the more obvious conflict
between privacy and security.
As mentioned above, despite the obvious threats to personal information
privacy posed by the increased adoption and use of sophisticated ALPR
technologies by law enforcement, FOI laws in some jurisdictions have also been
allowing citizens to access information about policing patterns and the historical
movement patterns of law enforcement officers utilizing ALPR systems. In
essence, these government agencies have been releasing their ALPR databases,
including un-redacted license plate numbers, to members of the public through
public disclosure requests. These databases may contain not only the license plate
information of each vehicle scanned by the system, but also identifying information
about the patrol vehicle that facilitated the scan, including precise date, time, and
geo-location information of each scan, allowing citizens to track the patrol patterns
of police vehicles outfitted with ALPR cameras. Thus, in a very real sense, the
surveillance technologies used by the government have become a tool for citizencounter-surveillance and a mechanism for oversight.
It should also be noted that this type of willing disclosure by law enforcement
5. For other work in this vein by the same author, see Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive
Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 9 I/S: J. L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y. (forthcoming 2014), manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339338;
Bryce Clayton Newell & Joseph T. Tennis, Me, My Metadata, and the NSA: Privacy and Government
Metadata Surveillance Programs, in ICONFERENCE 2014 PROCEEDINGS 345-55 (2014), available at
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/47299/109_ready.pdf?sequence=2; Bryce Clayton
Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 12, 32 (2011).

400

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

indicates either 1) a strong commitment to a high level of departmental
transparency, which ought to be applauded; and/or 2) simply an absence (for
whatever reason) of any relevant state public records exception that might be used
to deny these disclosure requests. In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the public disclosure
in 2012 of an ALPR database and the subsequent publication of the location of all
41 scans of the Mayor’s license plate contained in the data6 resulted in a temporary
data classification that exempts ALPR data from public disclosure in that state until
August 1, 2015 or until the Minnesota Legislature acts on the issue, whichever
occurs first.7 The American Civil Liberties Union applauded the temporary
classification.8 But, in some significant ways, this classification alone, without
other measures to ensure public oversight of the ALPR system’s use, is unfortunate
and should not necessarily be endorsed.
In Seattle, Washington, the situation has not taken this same unfortunate turn,
at least at present, although the Seattle situation presents its own problems. The
Seattle Police Department (SPD) has been releasing ALPR databases to the public
for some time and, based on prior events involving conflicts in Seattle between
privacy and public disclosure, there are at least two reasons9 to suggest that the
SPD’s continuing disclosures are motivated by an interest in transparency.
However, the SPD practices are not without their own faults and, incidentally, such
faults are generally shared by most other police departments around the country.
Part II of this paper explores some of the privacy-related ramifications of
publicly accessible geo-spatial databases by relying on some recent controversies
surrounding the publication of publicly accessible geo-spatial data. In Part III, the
paper analyzes recent social and legal developments in the United States related to
ALPR use by local law enforcement. The recent Canadian experience in British
Columbia, which resulted in the provincial Information and Privacy Commissioner
demanding changes to data retention and information-sharing practices of the
Victoria Police Department (VPD) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) provides some interesting comparative points of reference. Part IV
presents an overview of Fourth Amendment privacy and the concept of privacy in
public and questions the proper role of ALPR systems in police practice against the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution.
Part V consists of initial findings from an exploratory empirical analysis of
6. See Catherine Crump, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers are Being Used to
Record
Americans’
Movements,
ACLU,
July
2013,
at
3,
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf; Eric Roper, City Cameras Track
Anyone, Even Minneapolis Mayor Rybak, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/166494646.html; Eric Roper, Police Cameras Quietly
Capture License Plates, Collect Data, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/165680946.html.
7. See generally, Crump, supra note 6; Current Temporary Classifications, MINN. DEP’T OF
ADMIN., INFO. & ANALYSIS DIV., http://www.ipad.state.mn.us/docs/tccurrent.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2014).
8. See generally Crump, supra note 6.
9. These include 1) prior use of state privacy law to defend withholding dash-camera footage
under state public disclosure law to protect bystander privacy (without any similar attempt in the case of
ALPR data), and 2) a renewed SPD 20/20 transparency program. See SPD 20/20 – A Vision for the
Future, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/spd2020 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
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two databases of ALPR data received under state FOI law from the SPD amounting
to approximately over 1.7 million ALPR scans10 over a roughly three-month period
(the “SPD Databases”). In Part VI, the paper examines the efficacy of FOI laws
that provide public access to these databases that contain a great deal of personally
identifiable information, and the proper role of public access in establishing a form
of reciprocal surveillance intended to promote responsible citizen oversight and
preserve individual freedom.
Finally, in conclusion, the paper provides a normative argument for the right of
privacy in personal information in public spaces, balanced against the important
societal interest in government transparency and open access to government
information. This normative theory attempts to account for and differentiate
between the different roles of citizens and public officials carrying out their official
duties, and their respective rights to privacy in public spaces. This normative
argument provides a prescription for ALPR data privacy practices while still
ensuring a certain level of public access to government information.
II. PUBLIC OUTRAGE OVER PUBLIC ACCESS
A number of recent developments highlight the building tensions between FOI
or access to information (ATI) laws and the personal privacy interests of individual
members of the public. As government agencies increasingly collect, use, sell,
share, and archive personal information for various purposes (whether to protect
national security interests, facilitate more efficient policing, or administer
government programs), the informational privacy rights of individuals are
potentially threatened when this personal information is publicly accessible under
local or national FOI or ATI laws. This apparent tension pits two ideals directly
against each other. Open access to government information serves as an important
check on government power and abuse; one used by journalists and others for very
legitimate reasons. Privacy rights in personal information also provide some check
on government overreaching, as demonstrated by the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure and by the line of decisional
privacy decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court following
Griswold v. Connecticut.11 In some instances, these tensions have been highlighted
by the online mapping of publicly accessible geo-spatial information, and these
developments have spurred both legal change and public outrage.
A. The New York Gun Map
In response to the tragic shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown,
Connecticut in December 2012, a suburban New York state newspaper filed public
records requests for the personal information of all pistol permit holders within
three nearby counties. Subsequently, the paper generated and published an
interactive online map that included the names and addresses of each of the
10. The data includes data from two separate databases, each connected to a different ALPR system
in use by the SPD during the relevant timeframe. The two databases contain a total of 1,779,266 rows
of license plate scans (at one row per scan) (not excluding certain rows generated by the systems for
other purposes).
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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individuals who had pistol permits in two of these counties (Rockland and
Westchester).12 The newspaper received the gun permit information through public
records requests, and the data was released as publicly accessible information under
state FOI law. Needless to say, the map—sourced from publicly available
information—caused quite a controversy. In response, the New York legislature
quickly passed the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act
(“NY SAFE Act”), which amended the state Penal Law to allow gun owners to
request that their permit applications become exempt from public disclosure.13
Following the enactment of the NY SAFE Act, the newspaper took its map
offline.14 The amended state Penal Law also had some slightly counter-intuitive
ramifications. Prior to enactment, pistol permit holders’ personal information had
been shielded from disclosure to commercial entities seeking to use the information
for marketing purposes, but not to the broader public. After the NY SAFE Act
came into force, however, this personal information was no longer shielded unless
the individual permit holders file the appropriate form seeking an exemption.15
Thus, marketing companies now gain greater access to this personal information,
unless individual gun owners take affirmative steps to protect their privacy.
B. Proposition 8 Donor Map
While information about donations to political campaigns or ballot initiatives
can serve a valuable purpose, releasing this information publicly may also lead to
harassment and disincentivize political donations from citizens who are concerned
about being publicly associated with a sensitive political position. This scenario
was played out clearly when personal information of donors to the campaign for
California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, which would have prohibited same-sex
marriages in California, was overlaid onto Google Maps, thus allowing a visual,
map-based, searchable database of Proposition 8 supporters.16 As a consequence,
supporters were targeted by death threats, scare tactics, and boycotts of supporterowned businesses.17 California access law made names, zip codes, employer
information, and donation amounts public. While exact addresses and contact
information were not included in the released data, this information could easily be
determined using simple web-based services.

12. See, e.g., Julie Moos, Newspaper Publishes Names, Addresses of Gun Owners, POYNTER.ORG,
http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/199148/newspaper-publishes-names-addresses-of-gunowners (last updated Jan. 7, 2013).
13. See Public Records Exemption - FOIL Form FAQ, N.Y. DIV. OF ST. POLICE,
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Firearms/Public_Records_Exemption (last visited Jan 18, 2014).
14. See Andrew Khouri, N.Y. Newspaper Removes Online Map of Gun-permit Holders, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/20/nation/la-na-nn-new-york-newspaper-gun-permitsmap-offline-20130119.
15. See Glenn Coin, NY Safe Act Requires Onondaga County to Release Many Pistol Permit
Holders' Names, State Official Says, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2013/08/onondaga_county_must_release_pistol_permit_holders_names_addresses_says
_state_op.html.
16. See Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2009, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html.
17. Id.
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III. ALPR USE IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UK
As the world now knows, the National Security Administration (NSA) has
been collecting vast amounts of personal information about American citizens (in
some cases breaking its own rules and violating the Constitution) and has been
sharing this information, sometimes even in raw, un-redacted form, with friendly
foreign intelligence agencies.18 Closer to home, many local governments have
been quietly amassing large databases of scanned license plates through the use of
automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems that can scan and track the
movements of vehicles within their jurisdictions (and beyond, through interdepartmental collaboration and the aggregation of local databases).19 In fact,
according to one recent survey with responses from over 70 agencies, 85% of
responding police departments had or expected to implement ALPR technologies
within the next five years, and 70 percent of responding agencies reported that they
already used some form of predictive policing, defined as “the advanced use of
information/technology to predict and prevent crime.”20 Importantly, as indicated
earlier, not all use of these systems is inappropriate or even unwanted, but the
competing tensions between individual privacy, an effective and efficient criminal
justice system, and public disclosure of government information makes the topic
ripe for informed and thoughtful analysis.
In the United States, ALPR systems have become popular with local law
enforcement and various state and local transportation departments. Government
agencies are using these systems to track commercial carriers, facilitate quicker
passage on toll roads and bridges, and to detect traffic congestion and estimate
travel times to help motorists navigate away from congested streets or freeways.
Police departments are also using these systems, whether mounted on stationary
poles, parking enforcement vehicles, or patrol cars, to locate stolen vehicles or
other vehicles of interest, and to detect vehicles with unpaid parking tickets as a
way to generate additional revenue.
In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union filed 587 freedom of information
requests with local law enforcement and other state agencies around the country
seeking information about ALPR use, resulting in over 26,000 pages of released
documentation after just 293 responses (50% of the total requests).21 These
responses indicate that, as a general observation, less than 1 percent of scans
actually result in a “hit”—or a scan of a license plate in a police database because
of some (at least alleged) connection to on-going or previous infraction or
18. See Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Shares Raw Intelligence
Including
Americans'
Data
with
Israel,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
11,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents; Newell,
supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Police Across U.S. Quietly Turning to Cameras That Track All
Vehicles' Movements: Survey, SLATE.COM (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2013/01/14/automatic_license_plate_readers_survey_shows_most_u_s_police_agencies_pl
an.html.
20. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: HOW ARE
INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING? 1 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Technology_web2.pdf.
21. See Crump, supra note 6, at 3.
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suspicious or criminal activity.22
Surveillance in public spaces is becoming increasingly common,23 and in our
modern society, corporations, organizations, governments, and even other
individual citizens are the surveillance agents.24 In the United States, our presence
in a public space has generally equated to a waiver of any legally enforceable right
to privacy for anything we do or say in those places—or in information about our
physical location—on the premise that such information has been voluntarily
disclosed to third parties by virtue of our very presence in public itself.25 In the
following sections, this paper survey’s the legal landscape, explores the contents of
an actual ALPR database, and questions whether rapidly advancing surveillance
technologies (and particularly ALPR, for present purposes) should cause us to
rethink how we approach regulating law enforcement collection and retention of
ALPR data, protecting (or not protecting) privacy in public, and access to
government information.
A. The Law in the United States
At present in the U.S., only six states have laws on the books that directly
regulate the use of ALPR systems by law enforcement26 and at least two others
have regulated ALPR use by a directive from the state Attorney General’s office.27
At least three other states and federal authorities are also considering ways to
regulate such systems,28 additional states have toll collection or traffic stop statutes

22. Id. at 13.
23. See generally Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281 (2011); ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS 1 (2010) (“Beyond data mining, video surveillance, facial recognition technology,
spyware, and a host of other invasive tools are opening up private life for public consumption.”).
24. Gary T. Marx, Surveillance and Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY 817-22 (G.
Ritzer ed., 2005), available at http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/surandsoc.html.
25. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Helen
Nissembaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L. &
PHIL. 559, 567 (1998); Helen Nissembaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of
Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 212 (1998). But see Von Hannover v. Germany,
2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 294 (opposing view from the European Court of Human Rights); Newell, supra
note 5, at 32.
26. See Crump, supra note 6, at 31 (noting five states with ALPR laws and two with state Attorney
General opinions).
27. See Va. Op. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 12-073, 2013 WL 653025 (Feb. 13, 2013); Directive No.
2010-5: Law Enforcement Directive Promulgating Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and Stored ALPR Data from Paula T. Dow, Att’y Gen.,
N.J., to Dir., Office of Homeland Sec. & Preparedness, et al., (Dec. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf
[hereinafter Directive No. 2010-5].
28. See, e.g., S.B. 226, 2014 Sess. (Fla. 2014), available at http://www.flsenate.gov
Session/Bill/2014/0226/BillText/c2/PDF (exempting ALPR data from public disclosure); H.B. 3068,
188th Sess. (Mass. 2013), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H3068; Press Release,
State Rep. Sam Singh, State Rep. Sam Singh Announces Bill to Regulate Use of License Plate Readers
(Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://069.housedems.com/news/article/state-rep-sam-singh-announces-billto-regulate-use-of-license-plate-readers.
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that refer to ALPR,29 and some states have case law precedent related to the use of
ALPR for various purposes, including traffic stops.30 In the five states with
enacted legislation, regulation is not at all consistent.
1. New Hampshire
In New Hampshire, the state’s Highway Surveillance law strictly prohibits the
use of ALPR systems,31 as well as other forms of technologically-aided means of
“determining the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's
occupants on the public ways of the state or its political subdivisions” by state or
local government agents.32 This prohibition extends to the use of “any” device,
including cameras or other imaging devices, a “transponder, cellular telephone,
global positioning satellite, or radio frequency identification device,” when used to
determine the ownership of the vehicle or identity of a person inside the vehicle.33
The law does provide for a number of exceptions, however, and new
exceptions became effective in the latter half of 2013. These exceptions allow state
agents to conduct such surveillance to facilitate operation of toll collection
systems,34 to provide security for three named bridges in Portsmouth,35 when such
surveillance is incidental to state monitoring of state-controlled buildings,36 is
undertaken “on a case-by-case basis” to investigate specific crimes,37 or when
images and data are viewed in connection with a specific incident on a public
roadway (but recording is not allowed).38
Importantly, the law also prohibits the state and its political subdivisions from
obtaining any information—specifically, ALPR and related data—that it could not
collect on its own, regardless of whether the information is from private
corporations or other federal or state entities.39 This clause limits the ability of law
enforcement agencies within New Hampshire to access national license plate scan
databases or to receive license plate information from agencies in other states,
unless the information-sharing was undertaken in order to investigate a specific
crime (or under another exception as noted above).
2. Maine
Maine’s Motor Vehicle Code prohibits private use of ALPR technology and
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-7751(3), (16) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation) (toll
collection); MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 25-113(a)(6)(ii)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation)
(traffic stops).
30. See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 738 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Davila, 901
N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
31. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b (2007) (prohibiting “automated number plate scanning
devices”).
32. Id. § 236:130(I) (2013).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 236:130(III)(e).
35. Id. § 236:130(III)(f).
36. Id. § 236:130(III)(d).
37. Id. § 236:130(III)(b).
38. Id. § 236:130(III)(c).
39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:131 (2006).
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places restrictions on government use of such systems.40 Interestingly, Maine’s
statute covers a much more limited set of technologies than the New Hampshire
law, defining ALPRs more narrowly. Another section of the code, however, also
restricts the ability of government agencies from enforcing traffic violations
through the use of red-light or other traffic surveillance cameras.41 Under the
Maine law, ALPR is defined as a “system of one or more mobile or fixed highspeed cameras combined with computer algorithms to convert images of
registration plates into computer-readable data.”42
Exceptions allow law
enforcement and the Maine Turnpike Authority to use ALPR for toll
enforcement.43 The statute also allows the Maine Department of Transportation,
the Department of Public Safety’s Bureau of State Police, and other state and local
law enforcement agencies to utilize ALPR for certain stated purposes.44
To alleviate privacy concerns, the statute restricts the ability of law
enforcement officers to enter data into the system that does not relate to an ongoing
investigation or that is not based on articulable facts suggesting safety concerns or
criminal wrongdoing,45 and any non-hit data (or data not retained by the Bureau of
State Police for motor vehicle screening purposes) must be purged from the
database within 21 days from initial capture.46 The statute also specifically
exempts ALPR data from public disclosure under the state FOI law,47 which
obviously protects the privacy of individual drivers and vehicle owners but limits
the availability of data that could be used as a tool of public oversight.
3. Arkansas
In 2013, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted House Bill 1996, the
Automatic License Plate Reader System Act, to regulate the use of ALPR systems
within the state.48 The Arkansas law also prohibits ALPR use, both by private and
public entities,49 and provides a number of exceptions where such use is permitted
for certain purposes.50 It also limits the use of ALPR data as evidence in court
when the act is violated, and provides for a private cause of action,51 including a
clause allowing costs and the greater of actual damages or $1,000 per violation, for
violations of the ALPR limitations.52 Private use is only permitted when such
systems are used to control access to secured areas not accessible to the public53 or
to regulate the use of parking facilities.54 However, government parking and law
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2117-A (2010 & Supp. 2013).
See id. § 2117.
Id. § 2117-A.
Id. § 2117-A(1).
Id. § 2117-A(3).
See id.
See id. § 2117-A(5).
Id. § 2117-A(4).
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1801-1808 (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation).
See id. § 12-12-1803(a).
See id. § 12-12-1803(b).
See id. § 12-12-1807(a).
Id. § 12-12-1807(b).
See id. § 12-12-1803(b)(3).
Id. § 12-12-1803(b)(a)-(b).
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enforcement agencies can also use ALPR systems to regulate the use of parking
facilities or to compare captured plate data against hot listed plate information from
certain specified sources, respectively.55
The Arkansas law also provides some thoughtful regulation of the retention
and sharing of captured plate data. Generally, ALPR data captured may not be
shared, sold, or disclosed to other entities,56 except that law enforcement may share
captured plate data with other law enforcement agencies as long as the scan data is
evidence of an offense.57 Otherwise, captured plate data may not be used for
purposes other than those discussed above. Non-hit data must also be deleted
within 150 days of initial capture58 and, to help ensure compliance, the law also
requires law enforcement to update their databases every 24 hours.59 However,
data collected by law enforcement that is related to an on-going investigation may
be retained until the conclusion of criminal proceedings.60
The Arkansas Act does generally exclude public access to actual ALPR scan
data, and restricts disclosure only to, or with the consent of, the person to whom the
vehicle is registered.61 The law also requires entities using ALPR systems to
promulgate official policies,62 and to compile and retain regular statistical reports to
provide the public with information about the use and efficacy of the technology.63
In particular, the law requires disclosure of the total number of scans, the number
of scans resulting in arrest and prosecution, the names of the hot list categories that
plate data was compared against, the number of confirmed hits or matches with
information in the hot listed categories, and the total number of false positives (e.g.,
matches improperly made due to faulty character interpretation by an ALPR
system’s character recognition software).64
4. Utah
Utah also passed ALPR legislation in 2013, with the enactment of the
Automatic License Plate Reader System Act,65 which regulates the use of such
systems and also amended the state public records law to exclude public access to
ALPR data66 (with certain exceptions under the state protected records provisions67
or via certain court orders or a judicial warrant).68 The Utah law also defines
ALPRs narrowly, with almost identical language as that used in the Maine and
55. See id.
56. See id. § 12-12-1804(d)(1).
57. Id. § 12-12-1804(d)(2).
58. Id. § 12-12-1804(a).
59. Id. § 12-12-1804(c).
60. See id. § 12-12-1804(b).
61. See id. § 12-12-1808(a)(1); see also id. § 12-12-1805(b)(4).
62. Id. § 12-12-1805(b)(4).
63. See id. § 12-12-1805(a).
64. See id. § 12-12-1805(b)(1)-(3); see also id. § 12-12-1808(a)(2).
65. S.B. 196, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2013/bills/sbillenr/
SB0196.htm.
66. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-305(65) (West, Westlaw current through 2013 legislation); id. §
41-6a-2004(1).
67. See id. § 63G-2-202(4); see also id. §§ 63G-2-2002(4)-(7).
68. See id. § 41-6a-2004(1)(d).
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Arkansas laws,69 and other sections of the law track the language used in the
Arkansas law as well. The Act allows broader exceptions than the Arkansas law,
however. In addition to allowing law enforcement to compare ALPR scan data
with hot list databases, the Utah law also allows police to use ALPR systems “for
the purpose of protecting public safety, conducting criminal investigations, or
ensuring compliance with local, state, and federal laws.”70 The Utah law also
allows ALPR use for enforcing parking regulations, to regulate use of parking
facilities, controlling access to secure areas, for collecting electronic tolls, and for
“enforcing motor carrier laws.”71
Private entities may not store ALPR data for longer than 30 days and public
agencies must delete data within nine months, unless the data is subject to a
preservation request, disclosure order, or properly issued warrant.72 The law also
prohibits selling or sharing ALPR data for reasons not enumerated in the statute,
and allows—but does not require—ALPR users to compile aggregated reports or
compilations of ALPR data and to conduct statistical analysis of the captured data,
as long as the records are anonymized.73 Finally, the law contains provisions for
preservation orders requiring agencies to preserve captured data under certain
circumstances.74
5. Vermont
Vermont’s ALPR law was also enacted in 2013.75 It defines an ALPR system
just as in Maine, Arkansas, and Utah, but differentiates between “active” and
“historical” data.76 Active data includes plate information entered into system hot
lists and plate data captured by routine use of ALPR systems, whereas historical
data is defined as any ALPR data “stored on the statewide ALPR server operated
by the Vermont Justice Information Sharing System of the Department of Public
Safety.”77 Thus, Vermont has legislatively authorized a statewide ALPR database
that facilitates information sharing between state and local agencies. As evidenced
by an ALPR End User Agreement obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union
of Vermont in 2012, the State stored plate information for four years78 prior to
enactment of the ALPR law, which limited retention to 18 months in most cases.79
This database is the primary repository for ALPR data collected within the state, as
the law requires law enforcement agencies using ALPR systems to upload their
69. See id. § 41-6a-2002(1) (defining an “[a]utomatic license plate reader system" as “a system of
one or more mobile or fixed automated high-speed cameras used in combination with computer
algorithms to convert an image of a license plate into computer-readable data.”).
70. Id. § 41-6a-2003(2)(a).
71. Id. §§ 41-6a-2003(2)(a)-(f).
72. Id. § 41-6a-2004(c).
73. Id. §§ 41-6a-2004(2)(a)-(c).
74. Id. § 41-6a-2005.
75. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 legislation).
76. Id. at § 1607(a).
77. Id. §§ 1607(a)(1), (3).
78. Vt. Dept. of Pub. Safety, Div. of Crim. Just., ALPR End User Agreement, available at
http://www.acluvt.org/legal/docket/files/alpr/dept_of_pub_safety_docs/Vt.%20Dep't%20of%20Pub.%2
0Safety%20ALPR%20data%20agreement.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
79. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607(d)(2).
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scan data to the statewide server.80 The Vermont law allows the Vermont
Information and Analysis Center, which manages the database, to share historical
ALPR data with both Vermont and out-of-state law enforcement agencies for
certain law enforcement purposes.81
The statute also requires officers to be certified to operate an ALPR system,82
and restricts use of ALPR systems to certain enumerated “legitimate law
enforcement purposes.”83 Officers are also prohibited from accessing active ALPR
data or inputting plate information for non-legitimate purposes.84 The law requires
written requests to review data and limits access to ALPR information collected
more than seven days prior to the request.85
For oversight purposes, the law requires the Department of Public Safety to
institute internal safeguards to ensure that law enforcement are using the systems in
accordance with the law, and also requires the Department submit an annual report
to the State legislature detailing the number of ALPR units in operation statewide,
the number of units transmitting data to the state servers, the total numbers of scans
submitted by each agency to the state servers, the total number of scans contained
in the 18-month state-run repository, the total number of requests for ALPR data
from the state database, and the number of these requests fulfilled (for domestic
and out-of-state requestors).
6. California
California’s Vehicle Code authorizes the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to
utilize ALPR data but limits retention to 60 days, unless the “data is being used as
evidence” in a felony case.86 The Code mandates internal monitoring for
unauthorized use of ALPR data87 and also specifies that the CHP
shall not sell LPR data for any purpose and shall not make the data available to an
agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law
enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for
purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of
88
being involved in the commission of a public offense.

The CHP must also submit information about ALPR usage (including data
disclosures) to the state legislature as part of its annual vehicle theft report.89 In
addition to CHP usage, many other jurisdictions in California maintain ALPR
systems, and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC)

80. See id. § 1607(d).
81. See id. § 1607(c)(2)(A).
82. Id. § 1607(a)(4).
83. Id. § 1607(a)(5) (“‘Legitimate law enforcement purpose’ applies to access to active or historical
data and means investigation, detection, analysis, or enforcement of a crime, traffic violation, or parking
violation or operation of AMBER alerts or missing or endangered person searches.”).
84. Id. § 1607(c)(1)(B).
85. Id. § 1607(c)(1)(C).
86. CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413(b) (West, Westlaw current through 2013 legislation).
87. Id. § 2413(d).
88. Id. § 2413(c).
89. Id. § 2413(e).
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coordinates ALPR data from over 20 police departments.90
7. Virginia
In Virginia, the state Attorney General has issued an opinion limiting state law
enforcement from collecting passive ALPR data (i.e., passively scanning and
storing every plate passing by) under the Government Data Collection and
Dissemination Practices Act.91 Instead, law enforcement can only use license plate
readers to “actively” scan and store plates that have been particularly identified,
“evaluated and determined to be relevant to criminal activity.”92
8. New Jersey
In New Jersey, law enforcement use of ALPR systems is regulated by an
Attorney General Directive promulgated in 2010.93 The Directive itself explicitly
recognizes the role of mining ALPR data for detecting suspicious patterns—a form
of predictive policing.94 It also provides guidelines95 for ALPR use by state and
local law enforcement agencies, and requires them to develop policies consistent
with these guidelines. These guidelines attempt to ensure that plate numbers are
only entered into ALPR hotlist databases for legitimate law enforcement purposes,
that ALPR data is only accessible by appropriate personnel, and to ensure data is
“purged after a reasonable period of time.”96 Additionally, the guidelines state that
law enforcement policies should be designed
to permit a thorough analysis of stored ALPR data to detect crime and protect the
homeland from terrorist attack while safeguarding the personal privacy rights of
motorists by ensuring that the analysis of stored ALPR data is not used as a means
to disclose personal identifying information about an individual unless there is a
legitimate and documented law enforcement reason for disclosing such personal
97
information to a law enforcement officer or civilian crime analyst.

B. ALPR Systems in Canada and the UK
ALPR technology was originally developed in the UK, at Cambridge
University, in response to threats from the Irish Republican Army.98 Recently, the
UK Information Commissioner found that the use of ALPR cameras at every entry
90. See Crump, supra note 6, at 22.
91. VA CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 legislation).
92. See Va. Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 27, at 1.
93. See Directive No. 2010-5, supra note 27.
94. See id. at 2 (“A careful analysis of stored ALPR data can also be used to detect suspicious
activities that are consistent with the modus operandi of criminals”).
95. Office of the N.J. Att’y Gen., Dept. of L. & Pub. Safety, Att’y Gen. Guidelines for the Use of
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and Stored ALPR Data (eff. Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf.
96. Id. at 1, § 1.1.
97. Id.
98. Norm Gaumont, The Role of Automatic License Plate Recognition Technology in Policing:
Results from the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, 75 THE POLICE CHIEF, no. 11, Nov. 2008,
available
at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=1671.
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and exit point to a small British city (a so-called “Ring of Steel”) violated the UK
Data Protection Act as being unlawful and excessive.99
Canadian law enforcement has also been utilizing ALPR systems since initial
RCMP testing in 2006.100 Most recently, and most relevant to the present
discussion, the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BCIPC)
conducted an investigation of the use of ALPR by the Victoria Police Department
(VPD) and RCMP in late 2012, concluding that certain practices violated
provincial privacy law.101 In particular, the BCIPC concluded that VPD retention
of non-hit plate information, and subsequent sharing of this information with the
RCMP, violated the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(FIPPA). Importantly, the BCIPC stated that
FIPPA authorizes the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for a
law enforcement purpose. VICPD collects personal information for the purpose of
comparison against the alert listing. Once this comparison is accomplished, the
authorized use of information associated with non-hits and obsolete-hits has been
exhausted. FIPPA does not authorize VICPD to continue to use this information
unless it obtains the consent of the individual that the information is about. VICPD
102
is likewise not authorized to disclose this information to the RCMP.

This approach, codified in British Columbian law and the equivalent federal
legislation, takes significant steps toward respecting personal information privacy
as the right to control access to and uses of personal information,103 even requiring
consent for the continued storage and analysis of personal information gathered in a
public space. Against the backdrop of recent legal American developments in the
D.C. Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court,104 this approach will be well suited to inform
the future of Fourth Amendment reform in the United States.
IV. FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
A. Defining and Defending Privacy
As used throughout this paper, informational privacy is defined as the right to

99. Press Release, U.K. Info. Comm’r, Data Protection Act 1998 Enforcement Notice (July, 15,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Notices/hertf
ordshire-constabulary-enforcement-notice.pdf; Press Release, Info. Comm’rs Office, Police Use of
‘Ring Of Steel’ is Disproportionate and Must Be Reviewed (July 24, 2013), available at
http://www.ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2013/Police-use-of-Ring-of-Steel-is-disproportionate-andmust-be-reviewed-24072013.
100. See ELIZABETH DENHAM, OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF B.C., INVESTIGATION
REPORT F12-04: USE OF AUTOMATED LICENCE PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY BY THE VICTORIA
POLICE DEPARTMENT 10-11 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigationreports/1480.
101. Id. at 6, 29.
102. Id. at 6.
103. See arguments made infra Part IV.
104. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

412

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

control access to and uses of personal information.105 This definition explicitly
recognizes that individuals should have some rights to control not just access to
personal information, but also some subsequent uses of that information,106 even
after disclosure to third parties in certain circumstances. This definition recognizes
that certain actions may waive, explicitly or impliedly, a privacy interest.
Additionally, the definition is informed by the mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment recently considered in the wake of recent decisions in U.S. v. Jones107
and U.S. v. Maynard.108 A person’s right to limit access to and use of certain
personal information (e.g., a person’s current or past geographic location) that has
not been kept strictly “secret” by virtue of the fact that is was available in a public
space should still, in some circumstances, remain legally enforceable under the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable search or seizure.
In essence, this is an argument for a right to privacy in certain information that,
when viewed discretely or in the aggregate, is generally not qualitatively or
quantitatively available to the public at large (or, as Judge Ginsburg of the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia phrased it, such information is not actually or
constructively exposed to the public109).
The aggregation of geolocation
information over a substantial time period allows law enforcement to easily
discover information that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different than
what is knowingly and voluntarily exposed to the public at large, even though it is,
in essence, just an aggregation of distinct bits of information individually exposed
to the public (although tracking a person’s cell phone also allows tracking when a
person is inside a private building or, potentially, in the sanctity of their home,110
which is distinctly private information).
In this pursuit, this paper will examine the proposition made by Justice
Sotomayor in Jones that the time has come to rethink the legal significance of
allowing third-party access to personal information when considering privacy
interests in public spaces. By restricting the third-party rule in our Fourth
Amendment analysis, such that any release of information to a third party is not
necessarily a complete and total waiver to all forms of access and use by anyone at
all, we respect the drastic changes in technological possibilities and their proper

105. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 16; Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 812-13 (2007).
106. MOORE, supra note 23, at 16.
107. 132 S. Ct. 945.
108. 615 F.3d 544.
109. Id. at 558 (“[U]nlike one‘s movements during a single journey, the whole of one‘s movements
over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will
observe all those movements is effectively nil . . . [and the] whole of one’s movements is not exposed
constructively even though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—
sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”).
110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin & Greg Bensinger, Tracking Technology Sheds Light on Shopper
Habits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2013, 5:30 PM, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303332904579230401030827722; Annalyn Censky, Malls Track Shoppers' Cell
Phones on Black Friday, CNN MONEY, Nov. 22, 2011, 11:48 AM, http://money.cnn.com/2011/
11/22/technology/malls_track_cell_phones_black_friday; Jon Brodkin, 911 Tech That Locates Cell
Phone Users in Buildings Ready to Go, ARS TECHNICA, June 6, 2013, 7:57 PM,
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/06/911-tech-that-locates-cell-phone-users-in-buildingsready-to-go.
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role in government investigations while maintaining checks on improper abuse of
authority. Defining privacy normatively in terms of control of access and use of
personal information in this context can adequately protect informational privacy
and balance the competing, and very important, interest in effective law
enforcement.
B. Problems with Binary Fourth Amendment Theory
In the Fourth Amendment search context, legal definitions have often been
crafted to force conclusions about potential privacy violations based on binary
distinctions: either a form of investigation or information gathering by government
agents constitutes a search or it does not.111 This binary conceptualization of
Fourth Amendment inquiry itself is not inherently problematic—in fact, it may be
highly desirable. However, strictly applying the third-party doctrine—the idea that
most information disclosed to some other entity attracts no legally protectable
expectation of privacy—and the binary public/private dichotomy may improperly
restrict Fourth Amendment protections of personal privacy, especially when
considering whether individuals ought to maintain some right to privacy in public
spaces.
Arguing that something “public” is, or should be, private and protected by
legal rules is a difficult task. On its face, it rings of the paradoxical. Philosophical
theories of privacy have primarily focused, with valid reasons, on privacy interests
in sensitive and intimate information that have not been disclosed voluntarily to the
public. Whether geolocation information, even when aggregated over time, should
be protected is an open and controversial question. When a person, “X,” steps
outside of their home and walks down a busy public street, it is easy to conclude
that they have waived their right to claim a privacy interest in the fact that they are
walking down the street in plain view of other pedestrians, police officers, and
anyone else in the near vicinity. It seems ridiculous to suggest we should “turn off
our eyes.” But should the fact that the eyes in the scene happen to be those of
sophisticated robots or other electronic devices (drones, CCTV cameras,
smartphones, Google Glass, or an ALPR camera) alter this conclusion? Or, rather
than turn off our eyes (or recording devices), should we require the use of privacypreserving technologies, such as an anti-monitoring suit112 or device that obscures
the view of nearby lenses?
It seems intuitive to argue that these bystanders cannot, and should not, be
restricted from later telling someone else, including a police officer, about what
they observed. Of course, this characterization assumes that we enter public spaces
in a truly voluntary fashion. This might be debatable, as we often are required to
pass through public spaces to supply ourselves with food or engage in work, and
such a distinction would only strengthen a claim to a right to privacy in public.
However, despite this important caveat, the third-party rule makes some sense
insofar as it requires us to conclude that such a privacy interest has been waived in
111. See Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311
(2012).
112. Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information Control, in
INFORMATION ETHICS: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND POWER 199, fn. 32 (Adam D. Moore ed., 2005).
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these circumstances and in relation to those who also temporally occupy and share
the same space—they are the primary, if not intended, “recipients” of that
information. However, this situation becomes increasingly complex as we
introduce various technological means of surveillance into the scene, particularly if
the surveillance technologies are capable of recording data that can be easily
searched and mined for relevant information years into the future, as is the case
with some ALPR databases (absent the existence of more limiting data destruction
polices).
Suppose we introduce a few security cameras (perhaps a variety of red light
cameras, ALPR cameras, and CCTV cameras) into the street scene described
above. Now, X’s walk down the street is also observable by a security officer in a
control room, perhaps located somewhere else entirely. If the security system is
also capable of recording the video stream, the officer—or anyone else with
access—can later watch, rewind, and manipulate the recording without much
trouble. If the third-party doctrine (as currently interpreted) holds, the fact that X is
walking down the street in view of the cameras also means that X has waived her
privacy interests vis-à-vis the control room operator and anyone with authority to
view the resulting recording. In our current technological and social climate,
security cameras might not even pose the most serious threat to the permanent
recording of our innocuous public meanderings, merely because they capture so
little of it as a consequence of their limited placement (although whether placement
is still “limited” is debatable, as levels of video surveillance have been rapidly
increasing for years)113 and individual online vigilantism, compounded with the
ubiquitous nature of personal recording devices, may be increasingly likely to
expose our public meanderings and embarrassing blunders.
Reverting to the earlier caveat, as we increase the duration, extent, and means
of the intrusion facilitated by the various mechanisms of surveillance in the scene,
are we further undermining the ‘voluntariness’ of a person’s presence in public,
and thus the idea that privacy has been waived in respect to that information? If
information privacy rights revolve around the right to control access to and uses of
our personal information, the additional and automatic information flow from lens
to screen to hard disk to long-term archive encroaches on our right to control the
use of the information for temporally restricted purposes, which has been
abandoned solely because of technological intervention. At what point can, or
should, our presence in public constitute a waiver of privacy rights in all potential
future uses?
Many people on the street are likely carrying cell phones and other devices
capable of recording video or photo, often with GPS location information built into
the accessible metadata. This more recent reality introduces a sort of horizontal or
non-organizational surveillance (citizens watching citizens) that has begun to breed
new forms of vigilantism online. Imagine the person walking down the street is
113. See, e.g., Hille Koskela, ‘The Gaze Without Eyes’: Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature
of Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 243, 243 (2000). See generally Clive Norris, Mike
McCahill, & David Wood, Editorial, The Growth of CCTV: A Global Perspective on the International
Diffusion of Video Surveillance in Publicly Accessible Space, 2 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 110 (2004).
For just one specific example of this, see Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears as Surveillance Grows in
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/
privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html.
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also carrying a smartphone. The cellular service provider is probably collecting
continuous geolocational information and maintaining a database of the phone’s
location. Thus the service provider can make a pretty good determination of where
the person is (was), which direction they are (were) walking, and at what speed
they are (were) traveling. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Apple are also
providing live traffic congestion data for their electronic maps services, sourced, at
least in large part, from tracking the cellphones of anyone wielding a phone
running their preferred maps application or operating system. Supposedly this
information is being sourced anonymously, but presumably this is based on
corporate desire to avoid public outcry rather than any technological limitations,
and the technological ability of law enforcement to acquire specific information
from these services providers—as opposed to the wireless providers—is, as far as
the author is aware, still an open question.
Additionally, the increasing effectiveness of facial recognition software, even
in consumer products like Facebook, means that the capture of X’s image by fellow
streetwalker or CCTV camera can also lead to direct identification of X. Now, not
only does X’s place on the public sidewalk waive her right to privacy in the fact of
her location, it could potentially mean that X has waived her right to keep her
identity anonymous from anyone who might be watching, including at significant
distance (or at a different time) through forms of visual surveillance enhanced by
facial recognition. Any proponent of a right to anonymity in public spaces should
be rightly concerned that walking the third-party doctrine to its limits in the face of
advancing technology would seriously erode this aspect of privacy across society.
On the other hand, increased visual surveillance of society may result in more
efficient policing, crime reduction, and safer streets—although this point is
challenged widely.
Returning to our example, if X concludes her walk by entering her car, parked
some distance down the street in this example, and driving away, she is now
susceptible to additional tracking via ALPR systems and traffic cameras installed
and maintained by local police departments and departments of transportation.
Even if the departments are regularly deleting the images and license plate
information through automated processes, these systems promise the ability to
track automobiles in real-time and save data that might be useful in active
investigations. Indeed, the District of Columbia Police Department has utilized its
extensive camera system to track vehicles of suspected criminals in real-time114 and
other police departments have used similar systems to gather information about
when and where certain vehicles entered and left municipal boundaries or were
present in certain locations near criminal incidents.115
The proposition that the person has waived any and all privacy interests in all
of this “public” information about the person’s present or historical location can
still be made, but the situation is qualitatively different when the government has
114. Allison Klein & Josh White, License plate readers: A Useful Tool for Police Comes with
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-1119/local/35282829_1_license-plate-plates-in-real-time-tag-readers.
115. See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, New Tracking Frontier: Your License Plates,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904439956045780047236
03576296.html.
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such easy access to vast amounts of historical and aggregated geolocation
information that can be used to determine patterns or even potentially predict future
movements statistically. Of course, nothing is stopping a bystander or police
officer from trailing X and recording her movements in public, as long as the
trailing does not constitute harassment. However, the likelihood that an officer, or
team of officers, would trail X continuously for months at a time making constant
notes about precise locations and movements, including time spent at each location,
was extremely low when cases like Knotts116 and Miller117 were decided.
Presumably it remains so today.118 Regardless, the ease with which surveillance
can be conducted today makes it much less expensive and time consuming and,
presumably then, more likely to occur. Rather than a team of dedicated agents
tailing a suspect for weeks or months on end, a single officer need just notify a
cellular service provider that locational information is needed from a particular
phone (or query a large ALPR database), and pages of detailed, searchable data
could be delivered almost instantaneously, alleviating the need to physically trail
the suspect completely (at least for the acquisition of locational information).
Increased efficiency of law enforcement investigation tactics is hardly a sound
basis for requiring additional restrictions (indeed, this would be unfortunate).
However, the qualitative differences in the information deemed public and the
inferences that can be drawn about additional personal information suggest that
certain aspects of the third-party doctrine can, and should be, critically examined.
Traditional trespass-based decisions, recently reinvigorated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Jones, have determined whether a search has
occurred on the basis of whether a property interest has been infringed by a
government agent. The two-pronged Katz reasonable expectations of privacy
test,119 despite the allure, or dangers of its “hypothetical reasonable person”
standard, has failed to modernize in pace with investigative technologies used by
law enforcement around the country and remains subject to binary distinctions of
legal significance, such as the public/private dichotomy and a strict adherence to
the third-party doctrine or the idea that once information is released to any thirdparty, privacy interests vis-à-vis the government, when acquiring the information
from the third-party, are waived. Indeed, despite calling for empirical evidence of
societal expectations of privacy when examining the constitutionality of criminal
investigations conducted by government agents, this hypothetical reasonable
person has rarely (if ever) been a stand-in for relevant social science research on

116. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
117. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
118. See Frank Bannister, The Panoptic State: Privacy, Surveillance and the Balance of Risk, 10
INFO. POLITY 65, 68 (2005) (“Physical surveillance is labour intensive and presents the state with
difficult logistical and manpower problems if it is to be done on a large scale. Over the past decade
developments in technology have considerably increased the scope of, reduced the cost of, and generally
simplified, this process.”).
119. The two-part Katz test requires first that an individual must have exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy and, secondly, that the expectation must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable or legitimate. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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what members of the contemporary society actually expect;120 rather courts have
applied the test as a proxy for the work of social scientists and socio-legal scholars.
It has been suggested that the prevalence of binary dichotomies in Fourth
Amendment case law is a consequence of courts and lawyers attempting to find
easy lines to draw in court.121 However, the difficulties faced by the courts to apply
the Katz test uniformly, problematic application of the third-party doctrine in cases
involving government use of emerging technologies, and a resounding call by
commentators that Fourth Amendment legal theory is in chaos (and has been for
some time), suggest that the lines may not be as easy to draw at all. Perhaps the
time has come to rethink Fourth Amendment theory and reduce the legal
significance of some of the problematic binary distinctions that have plagued court
decisions for years, such as certain applications of the third-party doctrine.
C. The Third Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine has been described as “the Fourth Amendment rule
scholars love to hate.”122 For years, it has been subjected to voluminous amounts of
criticism, both by legal scholars and state courts.123 The Supreme Court has upheld
the rule, holding that citizens “assume the risk” that what they disclose to a third
party will be transferred on to the government, but has not explicitly defended it.124
And now, after Jones, criticism of the rule has reached the Supreme Court itself.
In its early years, the third-party doctrine was applied in cases involving
undercover agents and confidential informants.125 These cases held that defendants
could not claim Fourth Amendment violations based off of conversations with
government agents—sometimes wearing wires—because the “the Fourth
Amendment does not protect ‘a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.’”126 In later cases,
the Court applied the doctrine to business records. In United States v. Miller, the
Supreme Court held that a bank depositor does not have any reasonable expectation
of privacy in financial information (in the form of deposit slips, checks, and bank
records) because such information was conveyed voluntarily to the bank and
“exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”127 As such, the
court found that
[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . . [T]he Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
120. For a discussion of prior empirical work and the court’s (non)use of the relevant empirical
findings, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya, & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of
Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 311 (2009).
121. Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 647 (2013).
122. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
123. Id. at 563-64.
124. Id. at 564.
125. Id. at 567.
126. Id. at 568 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
127. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
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In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor stated that the time had come
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to discard the premise that legitimate
expectations of privacy could only be found in situations of near or complete
secrecy.129 Sotomayor argued that people should be able to maintain reasonable
expectations of privacy in some information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
The opposite and historical view of the court, Sotomayor stated, was “ill suited to
the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”130 Sotomayor
considered that logs of phone calls, text messages, websites visited, email
correspondence, purchase histories from online retailers, and geolocational
information were all forms of information that were technically disclosed to third
parties through mundane tasks, but where such disclosure should not constitute
waiver of all privacy interests.131 “[W]hatever the societal expectations,”
Sotomayor stated, these forms of information
can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for
a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
132
protection.

However, discarding the idea behind the third-party doctrine completely seems
ludicrous. Intuitively, what a person exposes to the public is just that—public. It
loses its status as private information exactly because a person voluntarily puts it in
the public view. To hold otherwise in all cases might seriously undermine free
speech and other important Constitutional guarantees. Certain applications of the
doctrine are not necessarily troublesome. For example, the suggestion that an
officer may tail a suspect while on public roads without first obtaining a warrant
seems entirely reasonable. After all, the information gained by the officer by
physically following the suspect is precisely what the suspect has openly and
voluntarily exposed to the public at large. Extending this doctrine, we can
conclude that an officer (or likely a large team of officers) should be allowed to tail
a suspect continuously for weeks at a time, all the while making copious notes
about the suspect’s movements and locations in publicly accessible spaces.
What, then is the problem with allowing the officer to utilize a more efficient
means of gathering the same information, namely through contacting the suspect’s
wireless provider and getting a log of geolocational data related to the suspect’s
phone (which has presumably remained near the suspect)? This question is a
difficult critique of the position I present in this paper, but I believe it can be
overcome. I also do not feel that my argument is aimed at hindering the efficiency
of law enforcement work without solid philosophical grounds. As stated by Justice
Sotomayor, the situation with prolonged geolocational tracking is different
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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precisely because the technological surveillance “evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and
community hostility’”133 and allows the government to obtain personal information
about individuals that is qualitatively and quantitatively different in kind than what
would be discovered alternatively. The likelihood that, in the case of physical
tailing, such a time consuming and resource-intensive investigation would be
carried out regularly without a sound basis is very small. Police are very unlikely
to devote such time and resources to this kind of visual surveillance except in cases
that really warrant it. On the other hand, the ease and convenience of obtaining
records from wireless providers could allow government agents virtually unfettered
ability to conduct this sort of surveillance in a wide variety of cases, including
“fishing expeditions” not based on any level of suspicion, probable cause or
otherwise. However, this position could potentially limit some important
investigations from proceeding as efficiently as they might have based purely on
departmental lack of resources to conduct extensive visual surveillance. But
requiring a warrant, based on affirmation of probable cause, before allowing
government agents to collect and analyze such extensive digital information,
should not be a serious impediment to most investigations and would help restrict
this sort of surveillance to legitimate investigations. Additionally, other exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, such as the emergency
doctrine,134 would continue to ameliorate these concerns in practice when time is of
the essence.
However, by limiting a strict application of the third-party doctrine, new
questions emerge about where lines should be drawn between permissible and
impermissible tactics in other contexts. For example, what are the important
differences—if any—between aggregating geolocational information, bank records,
“private” communication or messages on a social network like Facebook, web
browsing or search histories, or electronic purchase histories collected and archived
over time? The mosaic theory, originally announced by Judge Ginsburg in U.S. v
Maynard, may begin to help us sort out these difficult questions.135
D. Public Surveillance, the Mosaic, and the Fourth Amendment
Some scholars have claimed that recent (and even not so recent) advances in
digital technologies and surveillance capabilities mean that we should rethink
whether we can maintain any legitimate expectations of privacy while out in
public—or in “public facts.” In Jones, Justice Sotomayor proposed that the thirdparty doctrine should be abandoned (or at least rethought) in the face of
confronting Fourth Amendment challenges related to investigative use of new
133. Id. at 956 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
134. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Melinda Roberts,
The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
571, 571 (1975).
135. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases
involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’” (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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technologies.136 Justice Alito’s separate concurrence in Jones expressed concern
about the robustness of the “reasonable expectations of privacy test”—even while
advocating its use in that case—because of the potential that the widespread use of
new surveillance technologies could resign the populace to subjectively expect less
privacy than should be afforded under the Constitution.137 Indeed, geolocational
tracking technologies—which have now been used by law enforcement agencies
for some time—allow law enforcement to easily compile thousands of pages of
information about our present and past travels—in very exacting detail—and to
mine that information indiscriminately for patterns.138 Courts have also clearly
stated that Fourth Amendment law has failed to keep pace with advancing
technological possibilities. In one recent Ninth Circuit case, the court stated that
[t]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents
of electronic communications in the Internet age is an open question. The recently
minted standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text messages, and other
means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been
139
little explored.

Prior to Jones, the precedential locational tracking case was United States v.
Knotts.140 In that case, the Court held that police use of a “beeper”—a much more
rudimentary and non-exact form of tracking a suspect by radio transmissions141did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their movements on a public road.142 Police placed the
beeper at issue in a container of chloroform prior to codefendant Petschen’s
purchasing the container and placing it in his car. The court stated that
[v]isual surveillance from public places along Petschen’s route or adjoining
Knotts’ premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The
fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the
use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen’s automobile to the police
receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
143
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.

This decision grants the government the authority to amplify, or replace, their
own visual surveillance of a suspect moving in public spaces on the rationale that
all of the surveillance could have been done lawfully by actual officers tailing and
observing the suspect’s movements. However, it also did more than just augment
visual possibilities, despite the comparatively limited information produced by the
beeper as compared to modern GPS tracking technologies. For example, at one

136. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring).
138. In Jones, for example, prosecutors presented over 2,000 pages of data about Jones’s location
over a 28 day period sourced from a physical tracking device installed in the rear bumper of a vehicle
Jones regularly drove. Id. at 948.
139. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008).
140. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983).
141. See id. at 277.
142. Id. at 282.
143. Id.
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point the officers in Knotts lost sight of the car they were tailing and subsequently
fell out of range of the beeper, effectively losing their target.144 They later found
the device using a helicopter to sweep the area scanning for the beeper’s signal and
located the device near a cabin occupied by Knotts.145 This use of the location
tracking technology did more than simply augment the sensory capabilities of the
officers—it allowed them to locate a suspect using purely technological means
after visual tracking had failed. More recently, the facts of the Jones and Maynard
cases provide stark contrast to the limited technological capabilities and judicial
reasoning in Knotts.
In 2004, Lawrence Maynard managed a nightclub in the District of Columbia
owned by Antoine Jones. That year, an FBI-Metropolitan Police Department task
force began investigating Jones and Maynard (and several other alleged coconspirators) for narcotics violations. During the course of the investigation,
officers conducted visual surveillance of the nightclub, installed a video camera
focused on the front door of the club, and captured pen register information and
instituted a wiretap of Jones’s cellular phone.146 Based on information gathered
during this initial surveillance, the officers applied for and obtained a warrant to
place an electronic GPS tracking device on an automobile regularly used by Jones
(but registered to his wife).147 The warrant authorized the government to install the
device on the vehicle within the District of Columbia within a ten-day time period.
Eleven days later, the officers installed the device while the vehicle was in
Maryland in violation of the terms of the warrant—a claim the government
admitted to in the litigation, while still maintaining that a court order was not
required by law in the first place. Eventually, Maynard and Jones were tried jointly
and convicted of various drug related offenses. On appeal, the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia reversed Jones’s conviction based on his claim that the
government’s warrantless GPS tracking of his vehicle 24 hours a day for 28 days
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.148 Importantly, while announcing the
“mosaic theory,” the court found that
unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of one's movements
over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil… [and] the
whole of one's movements is not exposed constructively even though each
individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a
149
great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.

The court compared this case of prolonged modern surveillance with prior
national security cases where the government regularly invoked the “mosaic
theory” to shield certain otherwise public records from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act because, “[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 278.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
Id. at 949.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.”150 The
court continued by stating that
[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what
he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a
person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a
church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does
one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of
a person's movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office
tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a
baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another's
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular
at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact
151
about a person, but all such facts.

This concern was later voiced loudly by the Justices in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jones, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court.
Combining the third-party doctrine with the modern realities of massive data
collection made possible because of the ubiquitous nature of contemporary
communications devices means that location data, even historical data, is becoming
much easier for law enforcement to obtain without the need to secure a warrant
supported by probable cause, even without planting physical devices and risking
committing physical trespass. Indeed, the police in Jones did obtain historical
geolocation information from Jones’s wireless provider, but chose to rely on the
data collected through a physical tracking device installed on Jones’s vehicle
during the trial. The present ability of law enforcement to so easily amass and
mine such enormous amounts of personal information through simple technological
tools and coordination with service providers (such as wireless service providers,
email providers, or social network service providers) begs an examination of
current Fourth Amendment theory, the reasonable expectations of privacy test, and
the third-party doctrine.
E. The “Mosaic Theory” of the Fourth Amendment
Underlying the “mosaic theory” is the idea that the courts can sometimes
consider the information gathered through government surveillance (or presumably
the surveillance activities of government agents—depending on where we draw the
line) in the aggregate when deciding when a “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes has occurred, rather than being required to focus sequentially on each
distinct piece of information or government act.152 The theory was introduced by
Justice Ginsburg in United States v. Maynard, the decision by the D.C Circuit that
led to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Jones case. In his opinion, Judge
Ginsburg introduced the mosaic standard, focusing on whether the government’s

150. Id. at 562 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. Id. at 562.
152. See generally Kerr, supra note 111.
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investigation caused them to learn “more than a stranger would have observed.”153
Early commentary has resulted in both academic praise and criticism of the idea of
a mosaic theory. Potentially, considering this information, and government
surveillance practices, in the aggregate could help modernize existing theory, and
reflects a pragmatic approach to respecting forms of informational privacy that
would comport with legitimate expectations of privacy despite not necessarily
being consistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Critics express
concern that implementing this new theory would throw Fourth Amendment law
into deeper chaos and will require the courts to confront an expansive array of
practical questions and draw more arbitrary lines without precedential guidance.154
Prior to the recent judicial consideration the mosaic theory by the D.C. Circuit
and Supreme Court, searches have been determined by what Orin Kerr calls the
“sequential approach.”155
Under this approach, courts “analyze whether
government action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure [by taking] a
snapshot of the act and assess[ing] it in isolation.”156 According to Kerr, the “stepby-step” or “frame-by-frame analysis” is inherent in and foundational to evaluating
Fourth Amendment claims.157
However, in Maynard, the Circuit Court “likened the aggregate of Jones’s
movements to a mosaic, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.”158
Justice Ginsburg imported the theory from cases where Freedom of Information
Act requests were weighed against national security interests because “[d]isparate
items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor,
can take on added significance when combined with other items of information.”159
Thus, according to Justice Ginsburg, the difference between the whole array of
potentially public information and any distinct part “is not one of degree but of
kind.”160 Access to the whole set of documents could allow enemies to ascertain or
infer additional private information. Such it is with geolocational information and
the present ability of law enforcement to track individuals comprehensively for
weeks on end without any physical trailing. Apparent support for these ideas at the
Supreme Court may signal an opportunity to reform the Fourth Amendment
analysis in such a way that provides important protections for personal information
control in a world of quickly advancing technology and rising risks of improper
access to growing amounts of personal information stored in electronic computer
databases.
F. Finding a Legal Basis for Privacy in Public
Since Justice Harlan announced a two-part test in a concurring opinion in Katz
153. Id. at 330.
154. See, e.g., id. at 314-15.
155. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 315.
157. Id. at 316.
158. Bethany L. Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS
Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 736 (2011).
159. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).
160. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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v. United States161 in 1967, whether or not a person maintains a right to privacy—
for Fourth Amendment search purposes—is based on whether any subjective
expectation of privacy maintained by the individual asserting the privacy interest is
“one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”162 Generally in the
United States, courts have found that information released to the public could not
be the subject of any legitimate expectation of privacy under this test. From 1967
until the Jones decision in 2012, the reasonable expectation of privacy test largely
succeeded the prior focus on whether the government has violated a property right,
such as by committing trespass, in conducting a search. Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Jones, however, reinvigorated the trespass doctrine for searches where
physical trespass had occurred, while allowing for the continued use of the Katz
test when non-trespassory interests are allegedly violated. In Jones, the court held
that unwarranted placement of a GPS tracking device by the government on a
vehicle frequently used by the defendant, a suspected drug trafficker, violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers committed a trespass by physically
attaching the device to the vehicle. This opinion left open the Fourth Amendment
question for searches conducted without any physical trespass, such as when the
government tracks a cell phone’s location electronically. Additionally, the justices
were writing in response to the lower court’s decision by Judge Ginsburg of the
D.C. Circuit that espoused the so called “mosaic theory”—the idea the certain
government investigation tactics, such as tracking suspects via GPS devices or
geolocation data provided by cellular phone service providers (or, presumably,
other forms of data mining a wide variety of electronic records and online
information), empowered the government to accumulate such a detailed digital
picture of a person’s life, routines, habits, and travels that the information gathering
itself triggered Fourth Amendment protection, despite the fact that a search for any
individual piece of the same data might not have done so because the information
was in some sense publicly available. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor
expressed her worries that this sort of technologically enhanced investigation
changed the balance at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
In cases involving even short-term monitoring . . . GPS monitoring generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them
for information years into the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
163
enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community hostility.”

Despite the radical shift that such dicta might indicate for the future of Fourth
161. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
162. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
163. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted); see, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . .
. will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church,
the gay bar and on and on.”).
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Amendment doctrine, Justice Sotomayor’s call for greater protections for some
activity occurring in the public sphere is not the first time the idea has been
suggested in the courts. In the Katz decision itself, Justice Stewart stated that
[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
164
protected.

In that case, the government had placed a listening device to the exterior of a
public phone booth, and had recorded the defendant making phone calls. The court
found that Katz maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations
while inside the phone booth, even though it was in a public place, because the
court felt that
a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
165
in private communication.

The court continued its “discrediting” of the view that only trespass could raise
constitutional questions, elaborating that
once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
166
intrusion into any given enclosure.

Reading this language alongside Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, parallels
begin to emerge. The expectation that shutting the glass door to a public phone
booth makes the conversation private is entirely consistent with the proposition that
emails sent to an associate, purchase histories shared only with the online
merchant, geolocational information shared only with a cellphone service provider,
or a social networking status update visible only to a select groups of friends (due
to actively setting and maintaining privacy settings to ensure such limited
publication), could also be considered legitimate contexts where a reasonable
expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the government could adhere.167 However, the
historical reliance on the third-party doctrine would presumably discredit these
otherwise reasonable expectations merely because the information was disclosed to
an intermediary (e.g., Google, Facebook, Verizon, T-Mobile, Amazon) or a select
group of friends. Thus, the government is free to demand and subpoena this
information from these intermediaries without obtaining a warrant or attesting to
probable cause in court. However, the “vital role” that the public telephone played
in facilitating private communication (even in public spaces) in 1967 has been
superseded by a variety of electronic wireless communications technologies (e.g.,
164.
165.
166.
167.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
Id. at 353.
See Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, supra note 5.
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cell phones, email, text messaging, and private messaging on social media
websites) that also collect and transmit a wealth of data (such as geographic
coordinates) that find no easy corollary in the Katz analogy.
Some lower federal courts have begun to question a strict application of the
third-party doctrine as well. In 2010, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of
whether the government violated the Fourth Amendment when agents compelled
an ISP to turn over the contents of the defendant’s emails without first obtaining a
warrant.168 In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that, even though the subscriber
agreement allowed the ISP to access the contents of its clients’ emails in certain
circumstances, “the mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents
of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”169 The court found that this conclusion was consistent with the Katz
holding, because the telephone service company in the prior case also had a legal
right to listen to phone calls in certain cases. The Warshak court also differentiated
the facts in that case from those in Miller, because the third-party ISP was merely
an intermediary rather than the intended recipient (as the bank was in Miller).
Under the rationale in this case, the government could not demand the information
from the intermediary corporation or service provider, but the conclusion would not
necessarily extend to information released by the recipients of the communication,
such as the email recipient or Facebook friend. Whether this was the right result,
or merely a step in the right direction, remains the subject of some controversy.
However, as evidenced by the recent indication by the five concurring justices in
Jones (Sotomayor was the most explicit, but Alito’s opinion can also be read this
way) that they may be willing to rethink Fourth Amendment theory,170 the time
may be ripe for further challenges to precedent. Indeed, the fact that the Jones
decision followed from the introduction of the mosaic theory in the lower court’s
decision signals that the justices may be willing to entertain this issue in coming
years.
The recognition of the Court in Katz itself of this relationship between the
Fourth Amendment, private communications, and technological change, provides
ample support for the proposition that these new forms of private communication
(and the variety of additional opportunities they provide, both to government and
individuals) should be carefully protected as well. This analysis is more
problematic, however, when applied to geolocational information, which is not
clearly a form of communication but more like a public fact. The mosaic theory
provides one way to sidestep this concern, focusing on the qualitative difference
between visual confirmation of a person’s location and the vast history of
geolocational data potentially stored by—or accessible to—law enforcement
through modern tracking technologies, while preserving the idea that new
technologies should receive carefully considered protections under the Fourth
Amendment.

168. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
169. Id. at 286.
170. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of Jones v. United States in a Surveillance Society: A
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2012) (“[A]ll
three opinions in Jones made statements that call into question the Court’s ‘third party doctrine.’”).
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V. EXPLORING THE SPD ALPR DATABASES
The following section describes the nature of what is contained in the two
databases disclosed by the SPD under state FOI law. The first database (the “PIPS
Database”) consists of ALPR cameras mounted on SPD patrol cars. It is the larger
of the two databases in terms of number of scans recorded, with over 1.5 million
license plate scans recorded over a period of 87 days from January to April 2013.
The second database (the “AutoVu Dabatase) contains fewer scans, at just over
275,000 during a 77-day period from December 2012 to February 2013, but also
includes photographs of the vehicles scanned (the PIPS database maintained by
SPD does contain photos, but they were not disclosed in this case). Each database
contains un-redacted license plate numbers from the scanned vehicles, officer login
IDs, timestamps, latitude and longitude of each scan, as well as other information
about which scans resulted in hits.
Because the databases overlap in time (from January 9 to February 15, 2013)
they give a fairly accurate depiction of how the two systems were used and
deployed during that time period. Consistent with numbers reported by other
agencies to the ACLU,171 these databases indicate that hits occurred only a fraction
of the time (combined, at 1.2 percent of total scans). Interestingly, the larger PIPS
Database recorded a hit only 25 times every 10,000 scans. The two systems have
been incredibly active, scanning an average of 20,865 license plates every day over
the represented time periods. On January 9, 2013, one officer alone scanned over
7,000 plates in a single shift. Together, these mobile systems canvassed a large
portion of the city, as represented in Figure 1, infra, although certain
neighborhoods remained remarkably under-scanned in comparison.
Database

SPD PIPS (patrol car)
Database

SPD AutoVu (parking
enforcement) Database

Totals

Date range of scan
data:

01.09.2013 – 04.05.2013

12.01.2012 – 02.15.2013

-

No. of days in
database:

87

77

-

Total no. of scans:

1,501,547172

277,718

1,779,265

Avg. scans per day:

17,259

3,606

20,865

Total no. hits:

3,775

5,885

9,660

Avg. hits per day:

43.4

76.4

119.8

Percent of scans as
hits:

0.25% (less than 1%)

2.1%

1.2%

Tbl. 1 – Overview of both SPD databases.

171. See Crump, supra note 6, at 13.
172. This total excludes one removed line, which was filled with NULL in each column; other
system reads not excluded, so this number may be a little high for actual license plate scans.
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Not every scan returned accurate geolocation coordinates for the location the
scan occurred, although most did (76.5 percent for PIPS; 99.9999 percent for
AutoVu). On average, the PIPS system also calculated an 87 percent confidence
rate in the optical character interpretation, rising to 91 percent for scans resulting in
hits. Because each database contains information about individual officer logins
(41 unique login IDs in the PIPS system; 91 in the AutoVu system), and many of
these officers scan hundreds or thousands of cars in any given shift, the time and
location of each scan paints a very accurate picture of officer movements over time.

Fig. 1 – Mapped ALPR data from SPD ALPR Databases (cropped to include only
Seattle city limits). On the left, the larger PIPS database, from cameras mounted
on SPD patrol cars. On the right, the SPD AutoVu database, mounted on
parking enforcement vehicles.
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Fig. 2 – Mapped ALPR data from SPD ALPR Databases (cropped to include
only downtown Seattle). On the top, the larger patrol car database. On the
bottom, the SPD parking enforcement database.
Additionally, the databases indicate that multiple SPD officers scanned plates
outside the Seattle city limits, and one scanned passing plates into the relatively
distant cities of Snohomish, Port Orchard, and Fife.173 Other officers scanned
plates in Burien, Washington, and onto Bainbridge Island (including scanning
plates while on the ferry between Seattle and Bainbridge). Because of the detailed
173. Another, larger ALPR database from an earlier period obtained by the ACLU of Washington
State also includes scans outside of Washington State, when an officer scanned plates all the way into
Portland, Oregon.
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nature of the data, it is possible to calculate an officer’s rate of speed, determine
which exits were taken and at what times. This information has numerous uses to
determine whether the systems are being used in appropriate ways, and raises a
host of interesting questions related to privacy (of the officers and of innocent
citizens, including those scanned in areas outside SPD jurisdiction).

Fig. 3 – Number of ALPR scans on a daily basis from Dec. 1, 2012 to Feb. 15,
2013, as contained in the SPD AutoVu Database. Number of days with no scan
data: 14. High: 10,994 scans on Dec. 18, 2012.

Fig. 4 – Number of ALPR scans on a daily basis from Jan. 9, 2013 to Apr. 5,
2013, as contained in the SPD PIPS Database. Number of days with no scan
data: 0. High: 30,186 scans on Mar. 15, 2013.
Even a single day of data can lead to interesting exploratory findings and
provide a glimpse of how the systems are utilized throughout the city. Tables 2 and
3, below, present scanning data from both databases on a single day, January 23,
2013. Figure 5, below, presents graphically the geographic coordinates of each
scan created by two of the SPD patrol cars on the same date.
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User/Login

# Scans

# Hits

% Hits

Scanning Time

Hours

A
B
C
(two shifts)
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
Totals
Total (all
days in db)

6840
5757
811
1046
1687
848
807
752
428
221
152
128
7
19484
1,501,547

18
13
2
3
5
0
2
1
6
0
0
0
5
55
3773

0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
0.0%
0.2%
0.1%
1.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
71.4%
0.28%
0.25%

6:23am – 4:11pm
5:34pm – 11:59pm
12:00am – 2:55am
7:58pm – 11:59pm
11:48am – 7:47pm
12:34pm – 6:49pm
8:32pm – 11:43pm
12:25pm – 7:34pm
7:42pm – 11:56pm
12:02am – 12:37am
12:10am – 3:35am
1:49am – 3:15am
8:49am – 1:13pm
-

9:48
6:25*
2:55*
4:01*
7:59
6:15
3:11*
7:09
4:14*
0:35*
3:25*
2:26 *
4:24
62:47
-

431
Scans per
hour
698
896.7
278.1
260.4
211.3
135.7
253.5
105.2
101.1
379.1
44.5
52.7
1.6
310.3
-

* Partial shift. Additional scans take place prior to, or after,
12:01am or 11:59pm on Jan. 23, 2013

Tbl. 2 – Scan data for scans on January 23, 2013 (PIPS Database)
Unit

# Scans

# Hits

% Hits

Scanning Time

Hours

Scans per hour

1

3814
134
447
779

99

1.9%

7:21am – 2:36pm
4:42pm – 5:01pm
8:25pm – 9:43pm
11:00pm – 11:54pm

7:15
0:19
1:18
0:54*

529.7

2

4000
645
1052

45

0.8%

7:56am – 3:08pm
4:47pm – 5:44pm
7:59pm – 11:53pm

7:12
0:57
3:54*

472.8

Totals

10,871

144

1.3%

-

21:54

496.4

Total (all
days in db)

277,718

5,885

2.1%

-

-

-

* Partial shift. Additional scans take place prior to, or after,
12:01am or 11:59pm on Jan. 23, 2013

Tbl. 3. – Scan data for scans on January 23, 2013 (AutoVu Database).
Broken out when breaks > an hour.
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Fig. 5 – Scans on January 23, 2013 by individual scanning units. From PIPS
database. User/Login (correlated to the randomized identifiers from Table 2,
above) “I” on the right (n=221); “B” on the left (n=5757).
VI. ALPR DATA AS PUBLIC RECORD
Because information can provide and facilitate power, the collection and use of
large amounts of information (including ALPR data) can significantly impact the
relationships between governments and their citizens.174 Access to information
about government activities is often a prerequisite to gaining and exercising power
or seeking redress for potential rights violations stemming from secret activities of
others.175 The openness of the SPD, evidenced by their willing disclosure of
detailed ALPR databases stands in sharp contrast to states where statutes now
restrict public access to this type of data, such as in Minnesota, Maine, Arkansas,
Utah, and Vermont. In these jurisdictions, this willingness to allow government
surveillance (albeit with varying limitations) and limit citizens the rights of
reciprocal surveillance, represents a potential imbalance in power between citizens
and their governments. This imbalance has the ability to tip the scales of power
and limit the ability of the people to exercise democratic oversight and control
those they have put in power to represent them.176
As stated by the California Supreme Court,
it has long been apparent that the desire for privacy must at many points give way
before our right to know, and the news media's right to investigate and relate, facts
177
about the events and individuals of our time.

174. See CRAIG FORCESE AND AARON FREEMAN, THE LAWS OF GOVERNMENT: THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 481-84 (2005).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998).
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Freedom of information (FOI) laws have provided a great deal of access to
government records in recent years, and they serve as a powerful and effective
means for empowering oversight by journalists and ordinary citizens. In a very real
sense, these laws provide a legal mechanism for citizen-initiated surveillance from
underneath (sometimes termed “sousveillance”178 or the “participatory
panopticon”179). This form of reciprocal surveillance (which may take numerous
forms, including public access to ALPR data generated by the state or local
governments) grants citizens greater power to check government abuse and force
even greater transparency.180 Edward Snowden’s decision to leak classified NSA
intelligence documents to the press in 2013 certainly reinvigorated national and
international critique of large-scale surveillance programs, but the controversies are
not really all that new. And they do not exist solely at the level of national
intelligence.
VII. CONCLUSION
As government agencies and law enforcement departments increasingly adopt
big-data surveillance technologies as part of their routine investigatory practice,
personal information privacy concerns are the obvious jumping-off point for
critique and media coverage. However, law enforcement goals of more effective
and efficient policing to keep our streets and communities safe are also weighty
values that must be balanced against privacy concerns. How to strike the right
balance is, of course, a tricky question that will no doubt attract much scholarly ink
in the years to come. In the context of ALPR use, though, this paper advances a
few normative claims.
First, we must strike a balance between allowing large-scale ALPR
deployment and the privacy rights of individual citizens. Second, we must also
strike a balance between personal privacy and granting access to government
information, such as ALPR databases, since the disclosure of un-redacted license
plate information (as well as enough geolocational coordinates) can be easily tied
to an individual person, address, or place of business. Public access to this data
also risks officer privacy, and limiting access would eviscerate the public’s ability
to conduct certain types of oversight made possible by access to detailed officer
movements. Despite all these competing interests, a few conclusions seem
apparent, given the obvious biases expressed throughout this paper. These
conclusions do limit public access, but they do so to preserve the privacy rights of
178. See Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, & Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable
Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 331
(2003), available at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3344/
3306; Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, The Generalized Sousveillance Society, 49 SOC. SCI. INFO. 489 (2011).
179. Jamais Cascio, The Rise of the Participatory Panopticon, WORLD CHANGING (May 4, 2005),
http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/002651.html; Mark A. M. Kramer, Erika Reponen & Marianna
Obrist, MobiMundi: Exploring the Impact of User-Generated Mobile Content—The Participatory
Panopticon, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN COMPUTER
INTERACTION WITH MOBILE DEVICES & SERVICES 575-77 (2008).
180. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); KEVIN D. HAGGARTY & RICHARD V. ERICSON,
THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 10 (2007).
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innocent citizens (and, as a consequence, also protect the privacy of individual
police officers).
As a first step, we ought to limit data retention on non-hit scans in a reasonable
amount of time, as indicated by the BCIPC’s report to the VPD. This would have
two consequences: 1) it would protect the privacy of innocent citizens (those whose
plates are not legitimately on any law enforcement hotlist) by limiting the ability of
the police to conduct after-the-fact analysis of these individuals’ historical
movements and, 2) it would limit the ability of anyone to track an officer’s precise
movements with such great accuracy. There are two potential options for this
solution: either we require non-hot data to be purged from the database within a
reasonable amount of time (in British Columbia, for example, VPD is required to
redact this information at the end of every shift, prior to sharing data with the
RCMP) or we require the anonymization of non-hit entries in the database (e.g.,
redacting or randomly altering license plate numbers from the data).
Due to fears of re-identification, we might promote the first option: complete
redaction. This option preserves the privacy of innocent motorists as well as the
individual officers. On the other hand, this option also significantly limits the
citizens’ ability to monitor officer use of these systems as only a small fraction of
the overall scans would remain, giving a much less accurate picture of policing
patterns. The second option would maintain a larger corpus of data, for use both by
citizens and the police departments themselves, facilitating data-driven and
predictive policing efforts as well as citizen oversight, but does so at the risk of reidentification. For present purposes, without a more detailed analysis of the reidentification risks involved, either of these options represents a drastic
improvement in general practice, especially as these practices are exhibited in the
Minneapolis and Seattle cases.
As a second, and absolutely necessary, step, such anonymized ALPR data
should not be exempted from public disclosure. This normative claim supports
vital interests in government transparency, regardless of whether we opt for
redaction or anonynmization. This policy would allow some oversight through
public disclosure, and would allow the public to conduct an informed debate about
the efficacy and cost of the use of these systems in their communities.
This conclusion, bifurcated into two potential options, admittedly does not
answer the final balancing question completely. Option one does more to protect
privacy than it does to force a right to reciprocal surveillance, and the second
option preserves this right at the risk of re-identification. Neither is therefore
perfect, but both are better than what generally exists at present. Importantly, there
are strong reasons to push back against the trend to pull a curtain of secrecy over
ALPR data all together. This privacy-weighted conclusion is warranted, to some
degree, by the importance of recognizing greater rights of privacy in public spaces,
especially when it concerns subsequent aggregation and data-mining of otherwise
innocent peoples’ personal information. Modern surveillance technologies make it
incredibly easy for government agents to track individual citizens discretely and
comprehensively for very long periods of time. Court decisions finding that
citizens do not maintain legitimate expectations of privacy in their public
movements and strict application of the third-party doctrine to aggregated forms of
government information gathering need to be rethought and critically examined in
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light of modern technological advances. The unrestricted ability of law
enforcement to engage in mass amounts of geolocational surveillance that captures
the personal information of innocent individuals, including the use of ALPR,
threatens individual privacy and bypasses traditional checks on abusive
government actions. The nature and amount of data available about most people’s
movements—both present and long into the recent past—allows law enforcement
to draw inferences about other personal information, and should be subject to the
probable cause warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The mosaic theory
provides one useful lens and framework for analyzing these sorts of cases. It also
“protects the Fourth Amendment from innocuous erosion by society‘s ready
adoption of such technology” even as governmental “use of GPS devices becomes
a social norm.”181
On the other hand, advancing technologies and data-mining potentially offer
law enforcement greater ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute criminal
activity. These concerns for personal information privacy and the efficacy of law
enforcement are both very important in contemporary society. The tensions
between these two legitimate aims is substantial and, in the context of police use of
automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems, limiting the scope of law
enforcement data retention to protect citizen privacy might also protect the privacy
of the police officers using these systems. Thus, we can serve the interests behind
FOI laws, including the implicated First Amendment rights to gather information
about government conduct, and personal privacy rights by limiting long-term
retention and the sharing of any non-hit license plate information with other
agencies or private companies. The recent practice of the Seattle Police
Department demonstrates an applaudable commitment to transparency and,
combined with more limited data retention, as described above, would provide a
compelling example for managing the risks and benefits of ALPR use.

181. Dickman, supra note 158, at 738.

